It was alleged by the prosecution that on 30/07/1996 in the village of Lutukila, within the District of Songea the appellant was found with unlawful possession of government trophies. They were later on prosecuted before the District Court of Songea. Prosecution procured about five (5) witnesses to testify the allegations. The accused was found guilty and was therefore convicted.
In addition to banning large-scale pelagic driftnets by U.S. vessels and nationals, the Driftnet Act established a mechanism to deter the use of driftnets by foreign vessels in international waters. Under this mechanism, the U.S. Secretary of Commerce is to identify nations whose vessels have engaged in large-scale driftnet fishing in waters beyond any nation?s jurisdiction (i.e., international waters). The vessels of an identified nation are then denied port privileges in the U.S. and, depending on the outcome of bilateral consultation, the U.S. may further ban imports of fish and other products. In this case, the Humane Society sued the Secretary of Commerce and other government officials, alleging that they had shirked their duties under the Driftnet Act. Specifically, the Humane Society alleged that the government agency unjustifiably failed to identify Italy as a nation whose vessels engaged in driftnet fishing in international waters. The Court ruled that the undisputed facts established a non-discretionary duty to identify Italy.
A citizen filled a suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against a county in the state of Florida. Invoking a vicarious-liability theory, the plaintiffs alleged that the county?s ?refusal ... to ban beachfront artificial light sources that adversely impact sea turtles? violated the ESA?s ?take? prohibition. Indeed, sea turtle hatchlings suffering from disorientation due to artificial lighting. The Court agreed with the county that it could not be considered the cause of takes produced through lack of enforcement in Ormond Beach and New Smyrna?because the county did not possess the legal authority to enforce municipal ordinances? Yet, the court held that the plaintiffs had established causation vis-à-vis the county based on the county?s regulatory action.
The Driftnet Act establishes a process under which the United States may take various actions against a foreign nation whose fishing vessels on the high seas engage in large-scale driftnet fishing. Italian fishing vessels were using these nets. Subsequent negotiations between Italy and the President of the U.S. resulted in a commitment from Italy to terminate illegal driftnet fishing. Based on this agreement, the Secretary of Commerce certified that Italy was now in compliance. The present case arose in 1998 when the Humane Society and others brought suit in the Court of International Trade against the President and Secretary of Commerce because it had evidence that Italy continued to use driftnets during the 1997 and 1998 fishing seasons (i.e., after the U.S. government had removed Italy from scrutiny based on Italy?s agreement to end driftnet fishing). After a partial loss in the lower court, the plaintiffs appealed to the Federal Circuit. The Court ruled that in this kind of legislation, when Congress chooses a broad and ill-defined phrase (such as ?satisfactorily concluded?) to describe the threshold that an agreement must meet to avoid import sanctions, the courts will not intervene and say whether the particular commitments made by a country like Italy should have satisfied the President. Given that this question largely concerns the good faith of the Italian government, the President has broad discretion in making the final call. The plaintiffs argued that the Secretary should have conducted some investigation to verify Italian practices even after the certification was issued. Since this was not done, the plaintiffs argued, the U.S. government?s decision was arbitrary and capricious. The appellate court agreed with the government that the focus here was on the conduct and intentions of the government, not the conduct of individuals and fishing vessels. Therefore, the decision was not so unreasonable as to be arbitrary and capricious.
On 12.05.2001 at Mirerani village within Simanjiro District in Manyara Region the accused person was found in unlawful possession of government trophy to wit, antelope meat property of the government of Tanzania. The accused person was found not guilty and was therefore acquitted.
Since 1987, United States regulations have required that shrimp trawlers generally install turtle excluder devices (TEDs) when operating in U.S. waters where sea turtles are located (Section 609 of Public Law 101-162). A group of countries brought a complaint to the Dispute Settle Mechanism of the WTO. The WTO Appellate Body ultimately ruled that Section 609 was a permissible conservation measure, but that U.S. enforcement of it was discriminatory. Then, a coalition of environmental groups sued defendant federal officials in the U.S. Court of International Trade, alleging that the officials? regulations unlawfully permitted exported shrimp to enter the U.S. in violation of Section 609. Here, the defendant officials are appealing the Court of International Trade?s holding that the government?s regulations were unlawful. The appellate court found that the plain language of the statute only authorized an embargo of shrimp that was caught without the use of TEDs. This language did not authorize an embargo of TED-caught shrimp simply because the nation?s fleet as a whole lacks certification. The appellate court found no evidence in the legislative history to support the U.S. government?s position, but did find that the primary goal of the law was to protect the domestic shrimping industry from unfair competition (by foreign vessels able to catch shrimp without the costs of TEDs) rather than to protect sea turtles from drowning. The appellate court also held that Section 609 (b)(1) refers to shipments, not nations.
The appellants were jointly arraigned in the District Court of Nachingwea at Nachingwea on a charge of unlawful possession of government trophies. Both were convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for twenty (20) years. Aggrieved with the decision, they both preferred appeals to the High Court of Tanzania at Mtwara. The first appellant Esther Mbalale withdrew her appeal at the last moment after receiving a presidential pardon. The second appellant prosecuted his appeal. The appeal was dismissed.
On 2nd June 2001 in Serera Controlled area, Mto wa Mbu , Monduli District in Arusha region, the accused persons alleged killed three buffaloes using poisoned spears whilst not possessing a hunting permit from the Director of Wildlife. The accused persons denied to be in possession of the said buffalo meat. The 1st and 2nd accuseds were arrested while busy keeping the security of a maize field from monkeys. The 3rd accused person was arrested at a distant place but was also doing the same job as the other accused persons. The person who employed them testified that he saw three buffalo carcasses on the way to his farm to supply food to his workmen. The accused persons were found not guilty and were therefore acquitted.
The appellant Ausi Hassani Nampali was on 24th October, 2001 convicted by the Lindi District Court on two counts of unlawful possession of government trophy contrary to section 67(1) and (c) (d) (iii) and (2A) of the Wildlife Conservation Act No. 12 of 1974 as amended by Act No. 10 of 1989 read together with section 56(1) of the Economic and Organized Crimes Control Act, No. 13 of 1984 and paragraph 16(d0 of the first schedule there of as amended by Act No. 10 of 1989. The appellant was sentenced to an omnibus sentence of ten years imprisonment on the two counts. Aggrieved by the decision of the trial court, appeals to the High Court of Mtwara at Mtwara. The appeal is partly allowed. The appellant sentence and imprisonment is reduced into a fine of 25,000/= or two years imprisonment.
The appellant one Mauridi Ganame was on 17/04/1997 convicted by Lindi District Court on a charge of unlawful possession of government trophies. He was subsequently sentenced to twenty five (25) years imprisonment. While the court sentenced the appellant was not in court. It appears that the appellant started to serve his sentence sometimes on 28/02/2002. Records show that when the charge was read to appellant he requested bail. The Court granted bail. Later on while on bail the appellant jumped the bail. The District without issuance of warrant of arrest and tried the appellant ex parte. The appellant was later on arrested and started to serve his sentence. Now, appeals to challenge the conviction and sentence. The appeal was allowed, the decision quashed and the sentence set aside.